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ABSTRACT 
Rather than being a simple hybrid, the U.S. limited liability company 
is better described as a recombinant entity that combines attributes of 
four different types of business organizations. The LLC offers an 
almost ineffably flexible structure, but that flexibility does not place 
the LLC beyond the range of traditional, formalist analysis.  To the 
contrary, parsing the LLC in pursuit of conventional forms may 
allow us “to know the place for the first time.”  This essay uses 
conventional concepts to:  (i) explore whether “labels matter” when 
LLC membership interests are described as Contract or as Property; 
and (ii) examine how the plight of the “bare naked assignee” relates 
to the LLC’s status as a legal person distinct from its members. 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
It is conventional wisdom that within the United States, “limited 
liability companies are a conceptual hybrid, sharing some of the charac-
teristics of partnerships and some of corporations.”131  A more accurate 
description is that an LLC combines attributes of four different types of 
business organizations: general partnerships, limited partnerships, corpo-
rations, and closely held corporations. 
130.  Professor of Law and Director of the Mitchell Fellows Program, William 
Mitchell College of Law; A.B. 1972, Harvard University; J.D. 1979, Yale Law School.  
This essay is based on a paper delivered by the author at the 2lst Century Commercial 
Law Forum, Seventh International Symposium, School of Law, Tsinghua University, 
Beijing, People’s Republic of China (Oct. 22, 2007).  As always, Professor 
Kleinberger’s work depends on the insights and support of Carolyn Sachs, Esq. 
 131. Lieberman v. Wyoming.com LLC, 11 P.3d 353, 357 (Wyo. 2000). 
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The “pick your partner” principle and the bifurcation of ownership 
interests into financial and governance rights originates in partnership 
law,132 while corporate law provides the complete “liability shield” – 
i.e., the conceptual “non-conductor” that protects owners from automatic 
liability for the debts of the enterprise.133  The notion of management by 
owners as owners – which has been the blueprint for the “member-
managed” LLC – is derived from general partnership law,134  and limited 
partnership law provides the centralized management structure that has 
been the blueprint for “manager-managed” LLCs.135  The law of “close 
corporations” provides the perspective for understanding the “lock in” 
problem that exists when the “pick your partner” principle overlaps with 
perpetual duration. 136 
Into this mixture, the “check the box” regulations have infused a 
flexibility and variability of structure unprecedented in the U.S. law of 
business entities.137  Thus, by connotation at least, the word “hybrid” 
grossly understates the multifaceted and almost plastic nature of limited 
liability companies.  Those who invented and developed LLC statutes 
have done more than graft the branch of one entity to the stalk of an-
other; they have been gene splicing from among various business enti-
ties.  The adjective “recombinant” is more apt than “hybrid” to describe 
the results. 
The recombinant nature of LLCs occasions a reconsideration of 
fundamental questions in the law of closely held businesses, because re-
combination creates opportunities to view attributes in different con-
texts, revealing elements and consequences previously unseen or taken 
 132. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, supra note 35, ¶ 
8.06[1][a]. 
 133. Donnell v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 208 U.S. 267, 273 (1908). 
 134. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, supra note 35, ¶ 
7.02[2]. 
 135. Id. ¶ 7.02[3]; see also Kleinberger, Agency, Partnership and LLCs, supra note 
8, § 13.1.4 (explaining how IRS rulings preceding “check the box” were conducing 
toward a limited partnership management structure for LLCs). 
 136. Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith?, supra note 68, at 1148; 1 F. HODGE 
O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 7.03 (3d ed. 
2002); see, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 
505, 513 (Mass. 1975) (discussing the lock-in problem); Berreman v. West Publ’g Co., 
615 N.W.2d 362, 367-68 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing the common law fiduciary 
duty in close corporations due to their likeness of partnerships). 
 137. See Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act § 301(a) cmt. (2006) 
(“flexibility of management structure is a hallmark of the limited liability company”). 
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for granted.  These opportunities in turn create an obligation to recon-
sider fundamental questions, because recombination necessarily tran-
scends old forms that may have served some function.138  Those pushing 
the statutory development of LLCs have been and are almost exclusively 
transactional lawyers, who naturally seek to mold the law to facilitate 
the interests of their clients and their own day-to-day tasks.  Galvanized 
by Revenue Ruling 88-76139 and then liberated and emboldened by 
“check the box” statutes, they may have acted radically without fully 
understanding the consequences. 
So, perhaps “the forms must be observed.”140  To that end, this 
essay considers two questions:141  (1) does it matter whether the law 
uses the label “property” or “contract” to understand the rights in the 
business; and (2) is the limited liability company the apotheosis of the 
“separate entity” concept, and, how does the separate entity concept 
relate to the problem of the “bare naked assignee?” 
B.  PROPERTY OR CONTRACT, AND DOES THE LABEL MATTER? 
At first glance, the answer to the question “Does the label matter?” 
must be yes.  These labels are fundamental in U.S. jurisprudence.  The 
U.S. Constitution addresses separately the rights of property owners and 
the rights of parties to a contract,142  and for centuries American law stu-
dents have been taught that the subjects of Contract and Property law are 
related, but separate, building blocks of the common law.  In one famous 
and ironic example, the U.S. Supreme Court chose Contract rather than 
Property as the bulwark to protect capital from pro-labor regulation.  In 
 138. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in 
Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 359 (2001) (“This feature of property – that it 
comes in a fixed, mandatory menu of forms, in contrast to contracts that are far more 
customizable – constitutes a deep design principle of the law that is rarely articulated 
explicitly.  The fact that the in rem aspect of property has largely disappeared from 
academic discourse has made this latent design principle all the easier to overlook.”). 
 139. Rev. Rul. 88-76, supra note 43. 
 140. Harold Speed, The Practice and Science of Drawing 93 (New York, Dover 
Publ’ns 1972). 
 141. For the author’s earlier efforts in this regard, see Daniel S. Kleinberger, The 
Closely Held Business, supra note 66; Daniel S. Kleinberger, “Magnificent Circularity” 
and the Churkendoose: LLC Members and Federal Employment Law, 22 OKLA. CITY 
U. L. REV. 477 (1997). 
 142. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (constitutional rights of parties to a contract); 
U.S. Const. amend. V (constitutional rights of property owners). 
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Lochner v. New York, the Court stated: “The general right to make a 
contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual 
protected by the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”143 
Both labels have played a role in the law of business organizations.  
The Property label has been fundamental.  For example, the oldest uni-
form business organization act defines a general partnership as “an asso-
ciation of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for 
profit”144 and characterizes the partners’ relationship to the means of 
production as “tenancy in partnership.”145 
Corporate law refers to “stockholders” or “shareholders,” which be-
speaks ownership,146 and a leading close corporation case delineates the 
duties of controlling shareholders by stating: “The majority, concededly, 
have certain rights to what has been termed ‘selfish ownership’ in the 
corporation which should be balanced against the concept of their fidu-
ciary obligation to the minority.”147 
Partnership law has long recognized a central role for the Contract 
label, as well.  Although the Uniform Partnership Act’s definition of a 
general partnership refers to an “association of two or more persons” 
rather than to a contract among two or more persons,148 the official 
Comment explains away the omission: 
 
 143. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 
165 U.S. 578 (1897)), rev’d West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 144. Uniform Partnership Act § 6(1) (1914).  The Model Entity Transaction Act, 
which seeks to encompass all forms of organizations, uses “interest holder” as its all-
encompassing term for those with a recognizable stake in an organization and defines 
that term with property-like fashion:  “‘Interest holder’ means a direct holder of an 
interest.”  Model Entity Transaction Act § 102(20) (2007). 
 145. Uniform Partnership Act § 25.  One principal improvement made by the 
Revised Uniform Partnership Act was to replace the conceptually contorted concept of 
“tenancy in partnership” with straightforward rules delineating the rights of partners to 
possess and use partnership property.  Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 401(g) 
(1997); KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND LLCS, supra note 8, § 8.8.2. 
 146. See Model Business Corporation Act § 1.40(21) (2002); see also id. § 
1.40(15C) (defining “owner liability”). 
 147. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976) 
(citation omitted). 
 148. Uniform Partnership Act § 6(1). 
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To say that the association must be created by contract, is not only 
unnecessary, but in view of the varied use of the word “contract” in 
our law, if the word is used an explanation would have to be made as 
to whether the contract could be implied, and if so, whether it could 
be implied in law or only implied as a fact.  By merely saying that it 
is an association these difficulties are avoided.149 
Moreover, under all uniform partnership acts the partners’ agree-
ment is the primary determinant of relations inter se the partners.150 
Contracts within close corporations have had a more troubled his-
tory.  For some time “shareholder control agreements” were disallowed 
as an interference with the discretion and duties of those responsible for 
protecting the interests of those who had invested property in the corpo-
ration.151  Modern doctrine, however, recognizes the close corporation as 
an “incorporated partnership” and both statute and case law have legiti-
mized the shareholders’ contract as a way of predetermining “the deal” 
and protecting against oppression.152 
Thus, upon reflection the better answer to the question “Does the 
label matter?” may seem to be that the question hardly arises.  But from 
the vantage point of LLC law, a more complicated picture develops. 
To begin with terminology, under LLC acts the term of art is 
“member,” which does not connote ownership.153  The initial word 
choice by the Wyoming statute drafters may have reflected nothing more 
than a search for a new term for a new organization.  Still, the term 
“member” facilitates efforts to characterize the LLC as merely a contract 
among its members, thereby divorcing LLC law from “status based” 
concepts of fiduciary duty.  However, that divorce is possible only by 
ignoring the proprietary nature of membership.  If members are under-
 149. Id. § 6(1) cmt. 
 150. Id. §§ 18, 21, 27, 38, 40; Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 103; Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act § 110 (2001). 
 151. See McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234, 239 (N.Y. 1934) (declining to 
enforce a shareholder agreement and honoring instead the directors’ contrary action).  
See generally Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith?, supra note 68, at 1144, 1147-48, 
1149-50. 
 152. E.g. Model Corporation Business Act § 7.32.  See generally Kleinberger, Why 
Not Good Faith?, supra note 68, at 1149. 
 153. Definitions in both Black’s Law Dictionary and the online version of Merriam-
Webster Dictionary characterize a member as a part of an organization, without any ref-
erence to a member having a propriety stake in the organization.  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1005 (8th ed. 2004); Merriam-Webster, http://mw1.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/member (last visited Jan. 16, 2009). 
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stood to own property in the organization, it becomes difficult to ignore 
the notion that managerial power over a person’s property traditionally 
carries with it some measure of non-waivable duty.154 
The Contract/Property distinction also matters fundamentally in the 
issue of the “shelf LLC” – i.e., “an LLC formed without having at least 
one member upon formation.”155  The need for “the shelf” is practical: 
“many attorneys (and their clients) wish to have a limited liability 
company formed and on the public record while the relevant deal coa-
lesces – i.e., before the precise identity and relationship of the members 
has been finally determined.”156  The objections are theoretical and 
relate to the Contract construct.  “In theory, according to some . . . . a 
member-less LLC is an oxymoron and having an LLC waiting ‘on the 
shelf’ for the members to be identified is an example of the 
‘corpufuscation’ of partnership law.”157  From the Property perspective, 
in contrast, a shelf LLC makes perfect sense.  Members acquire 
(property) interests in the LLC by making contributions to the LLC.158  
Conceptually, therefore, the LLC’s existence mu
bership.159 
LLC law also teaches that the Contract/Property distinction can 
 154. See generally 2 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, SECOND THOMAS EDITION  § 
13.07(c) (David A. Thomas ed., 2000); 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bailments § 90.  See also, e.g., 
Diaz v. Fernandez, 910 P.2d 96, 97 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that because “a 
member of a limited liability company [has by statute] a personal property interest in 
the company” the member may have grounds to obtain appointment of a receiver); In re 
McCabe, 345 B.R. 1, 8-9 (D. Mass. 2006) (stating that a claim for conversion arises 
where one member of an LLC purports to readjust ownership interests to the prejudice 
of another member).  But cf. Steele v. Rosenfeld, LLC, 936 So. 2d 488, 493 (Ala. 2005) 
(holding that a membership interest’s status as personal property precludes a claim for 
equitable conversion, which, under Alabama law, is limited to claims pertaining to real 
property).  For further discussion of the impact of this point on the remedies available to 
transferees of membership interest, see Daniel S. Kleinberger, “The Plight of the Bare 
Naked Assignee,” __ Suffolk L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2009). 
 155. Revised Uniform Limited Liability Corporation Act § 201 cmt. 
 156. Daniel S. Kleinberger & Carter G. Bishop, The Next Generation: The Revised 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 62 BUS. LAW. 515, 528 (2007). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See MOYE, supra note 17, at 149. 
 159. Note, however, that the drafters of Re-ULLCA thought it prudent to 
compromise on the shelf issue.  Revised Uniform Limited Liability Corporation Act § 
201 cmt.  A recent federal district court case holds that it is obvious that shelf LLCs are 
permitted under the Delaware LLC Act.  ConnectU LLC v. Zuckerberg, 482 F. Supp. 
2d 3, 21 (D. Mass. 2007). 
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s interest as property and therefore fully part of 
the b
tory law will treat the LLC 
and other unincorporated business entities. 
C.  IS THE CEPT, 
AND HOW STATUS  
OF THE BARE NAKED ASSIGNEE? 
1.  The LLC as an Entity Separate from its Members
matter critically in the regulatory context.  Bankruptcy law provides an 
important and controversial example.  When an LLC member becomes 
bankrupt, fellow members seek to restrict the power of the trustee in 
bankruptcy by characterizing the membership relationship as not merely 
contractual, but also as involving a “personal service contract” that the 
trustee may neither assume nor assign.160  The trustee, in contrast, will 
characterize the member’
ankruptcy estate.161 
In provisional summation, one might say that, in the U.S. law of 
closely held businesses, the Contract/Property distinction remains in 
play and continues to matter – both for the theoretician trying to capture 
unincorporated law for the radical contractarian perspective and for the 
practitioner trying to determine how regula
 LLC THE APOTHEOSIS OF THE “SEPARATE ENTITY” CON
DOES THAT CONCEPT AFFECT THE 
 
cheme, and 
LLC
Comment further explains: “The ‘separate entity’ characteristic is funda-
 
For decades the entity/aggregate distinction complicated the law of 
partnerships,  but it is almost axiomatic that a limited liability com-
pany is an entity entirely separate from its members.  LLC statutes give 
this juridical proposition a central place in the statutory s
162
 cases often begin or turn on the recitation of this basic truth. 
For example, Re-ULLCA § 201(a) states, “A limited liability 
company is an entity distinct from its members.”163  The Official 
 160. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, supra note 35, ¶ 1.04; 
see also Daniel S. Kleinberger, Live Lecture at the Cardozo Law School Heyman 
Center on Corporate Governance, New Issues with the Limited Liability Company: The 
‘Pick Your Partner’ Principle Meets the Bankruptcy Code or Gőtterdämmerung When 
an LLC Member Becomes Bankrupt? (Apr. 15, 2007), available at http://www. 
sonnenschein.com/video/bamberger/pan_4.wmv [hereinafter Kleinberger, The ‘Pick 
Your Partner’ Principle] (last visited Jan. 16, 2009). 
 161. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, supra note 35, ¶ 1.04; 
see also Kleinberger, The ‘Pick Your Partner’ Principle, supra note 160. 
 162. Kleinberger, The Closely Held Business, supra note 66, at 830-35. 
 163. Revised Uniform Limited Liability Corporation Act § 201(a). 
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mental to a limited liability company and is inextricably connected to 
both the liability shield . . . and the charging order provision . . . .”164 
A litany of case law pronouncements is also available.  According 
to a Michigan state court citing New York law, for example, an LLC is 
“a ‘separate legal entity.’  Its members are afforded corporate-like lim-
ited liability protection, i.e., members do not have personal liability for 
the debts, obligation, or liabilities of the LLC.  In addition, like a corpo-
ration, it has rights and obligations which are separate and distinct from 
those of its members.”165  Similarly, under Maryland law, “an LLC is 
treated as a separate legal entity for purposes of liability and property 
ownership.”166  Bankruptcy courts have held that a limited liability com-
pany, like a corporation, “is treated as a separate legal entity and its lia-
bilities are not attributable to its owners and managing members.”167  
And like a corporation an LLC can “[s]ue, be sued, complain and defend 
in its name.”168 
To use the separate entity idea as a rule for producing outcomes is, 
of course, a type of legal formalism,169 but LLC law has done just that.  
The separate entity characterization underpins the members’ liability 
shield,170 requires and helps justify the distinction between direct and 
 164. Id. § 201(a) cmt. 
 165. Trident-Allied Assoc., LLC v. Cypress Creek Assoc., LLC, 317 F. Supp. 2d 
752, 755 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (citing Weber v. King, 110 F. Supp. 2d 124 (E.D.N.Y. 
2000) (referencing New York Limited Liability Company law). 
 166. Kreisler v. Goldberg, 478 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying Maryland 
law). 
 167. In re Gilbert, Bankr. No. 06-10119-JMD, 2007 WL 397018, at *3 (Bankr. D. 
N.H. Feb. 1, 2007). 
 168. Trademark Retail, Inc. v. Apple Glen Investors, LP, 196 F.R.D. 535, 541 (N.D. 
Ind. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). 
 169. Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 
YALE L.J. 949, 956 (1988). 
 170. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, supra note 35, ¶ 6.01; 
Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Westview Carlton Group, LLC, No. CV020469715S, 2006 
WL 3719484, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 2006). 
The assets of a corporation or limited liability company, therefore, typically are not 
available to creditors seeking to recover amounts owed by a stockholder or member of 
that corporation or limited liability company.  Nonetheless, “[c]ourts will . . . disre-
gard the fiction of a separate legal entity to pierce the shield of immunity afforded by 
the corporate structure in a situation in which the corporate entity has been so 
controlled and dominated that justice requires liability to be imposed . . . .” 
Id. (citing Angelo Tomasso, Inc. v. Armor Constr. and Paving, Inc., 187 Conn. 544, 552 
(1982)); Gowin v. Granite Depot, LLC, 634 S.E.2d 714, 719 (Va. 2006) (“A limited 
liability company is an entity that . . . shields its members from personal liability based 
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t is land.173 
derivative claims,171 and produces myriad other consequences ranging 
from property rights to the mechanics of litigation. 
For example, a member’s contribution of property to an LLC 
constitutes “more than a change in the form of ownership; it is a transfer 
from one entity to another.”172  A contribution of property to an LLC:  
(i) can trigger a deed tax, even if the contributor is the LLC’s sole 
member, unless the tax statute provides otherwise; (ii) can entitle a real 
estate broker to commission for the “sale” from the member to the LLC; 
(iii) means that the former owner of property contributed to an LLC 
lacks standing to contest zoning activities pertaining to the property and 
that LLC members cannot sue to partition land contributed to (and 
therefore owned by) the LLC; (iv) puts the contributed property out of 
the reach of the contributor’s creditors, unless a creditor can make a case 
of fraudulent transfer or persuade the court to do a reverse pierce, 
treating the LLC as if it were the member; (v) renders improper a lis 
pendens filed by a creditor of an LLC member against real property 
owned by the LLC; and (vi) renders inapplicable the statute of frauds to 
an agreement to sell an LLC membership interest, even when the LLC’s 
only asse
In litigation, as a separate legal entity, an LLC is authorized and re-
quired to sue and be sued in its own name.174  An LLC is also subject to 
particular requirements relating to service of process, cannot be an agent 
for service of process on any of its members (including a sole 
member),175  and cannot be represented by a non-attorney member.176 
2.  Why Push the Metaphysical Envelope? 
Precise attention to legal constructs is sometimes condemned as 
“metaphysical” and “similar to the medieval quest to determine how 
many angels can dance on the head of a pin.”177  Now that the practical 
 
on actions of the entity.”). 
 171. See Kleinberger, Direct Versus Derivative, supra note 69, at 68; Kleinberger, 
The Closely Held Business, supra note 66, at 852-54. 
 172. Hagan v. Adams Prop. Assoc., Inc., 482 S.E.2d 805, 807 (Va. 1997). 
 173. These examples come essentially verbatim from KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, 
PARTNERSHIP AND LLCS, supra note 8, § 14.4.2 at 491-92. 
 174. See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, supra note 35, ¶ 
5.05[1][e]. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Magana v. State, 230 S.W.3d 411, 415 (Tex. App. 2007) (Hilbig, J., 
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consequences of LLC entity status are so well and so broadly estab-
lished, it may seem like “empty formalism” to inquire whether the entity 
concept is fully realized in the LLC. 
But formalism has its own generally applicable virtues. 178 More-
over, it is possible that cross-examining the LLC’s separate entity char-
acter may help illuminate one of the most difficult issues in LLC law – 
the plight of the “bare naked assignee.” 
3.  The Bare Naked Assignee 
When an LLC member transfers economic rights to a non-member, 
absent approval of the other members, the transferee obtains no govern-
ance rights and virtually no information rights.179  The same is true in a 
general or limited partnership.180  The transferee can provide itself some 
protection, if:  (i) the transfer is by agreement; (ii) the transferor retains 
its ownership status despite the transfer of economic rights; and (iii) the 
contract affecting the transfer obliges the transferor to exercise its gov-
ernance and information rights to the benefit of the transferee.181  Even 
so, once the transferor “dissociates” – i.e., ceases to be an owner – even 
 
dissenting); see also, Idaho State Homebuilders v. Wash. Water Power, 690 P.2d 350, 
356 (Idaho 1984); Clark Equip. Co. v. Leoni Twp., Jackson County, 318 N.W.2d 586, 
589 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). 
 178. Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 
YALE L.J. 949, 956 (1988). 
In the formalist conception, law has a content that is not imported from without but 
elaborated from within. Law is not so much an instrument in the service of foreign 
ideals as an end in itself constituting, as it were, its own ideal. Rather than being an 
exclusively positivist transformation of the non-legal into the juridical, law can 
involve the recognition of that which already has an inchoate juridical significance. 
The paradigmatic legal function is not the manufacturing of legal norms but the 
understanding of what is intimated by juridical arrangements and relationships. Legal 
creativity here is essentially cognitive, and it is most naturally expressed in 
adjudication conceived more as the discovery than as the making of law. 
Id. 
 179. Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act § 502; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, 
§ 18-702. 
 180. Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 503 (2008); Uniform Limited Partnership 
Act § 702 (2001); Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act § 502; DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702. 
 181. See Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act § 602[4][B] (internal 
citations omitted). 
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that second-hand protection disappears.  Hence, the term – “bare naked 
assignee.”182 
The problem of the naked assignee is not one-sided.  Efforts to pro-
tect the naked assignee inevitably impinge on the members’ right to run 
their own enterprise.  The situation is well explained by a lengthy com-
ment to the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act: 
The law of unincorporated business organizations is only beginning 
to grapple in a modern way with the tension between the rights of an 
organization’s owners to carry on their activities as they see fit (or 
have agreed) and the rights of transferees of the organization’s 
economic interests.  (Such transferees can include the heirs of 
business founders as well as former owners who are “locked in” as 
transferees of their own interests. 
If the law categorically favors the owners, there is a serious risk of 
expropriation and other abuse.  On the other hand, if the law grants 
former owners and other transferees the right to seek judicial pro-
tection, that specter can “freeze the deal” as of the moment an owner 
leaves the enterprise or a third party obtains an economic interest. 
Bauer v. Blomfield Co./Holden Joint Venture . . . illustrates this 
point nicely.  The case arose after all the partners had approved a 
commission arrangement with a third party and the arrangement 
dried up all the partnership profits.  When an assignee of a part-
nership interest objected, the court majority flatly rejected not only 
the claim but also the assignee’s right to assert the claim.  A mere 
assignee “was not entitled to complain about a decision made with 
the consent of all the partners.” A footnote explained, “We are 
unwilling to hold that partners owe a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing to assignees of a partner’s interest.” 
 182. An early version of ULPA 2001 defined “bare transferable interest” as “a trans-
ferable interest whose original owner is dissociated.” Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 
Feb. 1998 Draft § 101(1), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ 
ulc/llp/lp298.htm.  For a case in which a controlling interest almost disappeared into 
bare naked status, see Lusk v. Elliott, No. Civ. A. 16326, 1999 WL 644739 (Del. Ch. 
Aug. 13, 1999).  The case involved AMI, an LLC that originally had two members, Mr. 
Elliott (with a 99 percent interest) and CRT (with a one percent interest).  “Before he 
conveyed his 99% AMI interest to the [Neal M. Elliott and Gail Williams Elliott] Trust, 
Mr. Elliott was the AMI’s sole managing member.”  Id. at *1.  CRT, which managed 
the LLC’s day-to-day operations, claimed that Mr. Elliot’s conveyance to the trust had 
shorn his interest of anything but economic rights.  Id. at *3.  The court sided with the 
trust, interpreting a consent to assignment as permitting the transfer of all rights.  Id. at 
*5. 
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The dissent, invoking the law of contracts, asserted that the majority 
had turned the statutory protection of the partners’ management 
prerogatives into an instrument for abuse of assignees: 
It is a well-settled principle of contract law that an assignee 
steps into the shoes of an assignor as to the rights assigned. 
Today, the court summarily dismisses this principle in a 
footnote and leaves the assignee barefoot. . . . 
As interpreted by the court, the [partnership] statute now allows part-
ners to deprive an assignee of profits to which he is entitled by law 
for whatever outrageous motive or reason. The court’s opinion es-
sentially leaves the assignee of a partnership interest without remedy 
to enforce his right. 
The Bauer majority is consistent with the limited but long-standing 
case law in this area (all of it pertaining to partnerships rather than 
LLCs).183 
The Re-ULLCA drafting committee struggled repeatedly with the 
naked assignee problem; several drafts of the Act allowed transferees to 
seek dissolution in cases of serious oppression.184  Eventually, however, 
the drafting committee decided that such an approach would undermine 
the “pick your partner” principle, could often “freeze the deal” and, in 
the hands of a litigious transferee, might serve as a weapon for extorting 
preferential redemptions. 
The final version of Re-ULLCA contains no provision protecting 
transferees from oppression.  On the contrary, the Act expressly pro-
vides that “an amendment to the operating agreement made after a per-
son becomes a transferee or dissociated member is effective with regard 
to any debt, obligation, or other liability of the limited liability company 
 183. Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act § 112(b), cmt. (citing Bauer 
v. Blomfield Co./Holden Joint Venture, 849 P.2d 1365 (Alaska 1993)) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 184. See, e.g., Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, Feb. 2006 Draft § 
701(a)(5), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ullca/2006febmtg.htm (provi-
ding that a court ordered dissolution “on application by a member, a dissociated 
member that has retained a transferable interest, or a transferee, . . . on the grounds 
that the managers or those members in control of the limited liability company:  (A) 
have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal or fraudulent; or (B) have 
acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and was, is, or will be directly harmful 
to the applicant.”) (emphasis added). 
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or its members to the person in the person’s capacity as a transferee or 
dissociated member.”185  A comment explains that the new Act: 
[F]ollows the Bauer majority and other cases by expressly subjecting 
transferees and dissociated members to operating agreement amend-
ments made after the transfer or dissociation. . . . The issue of 
whether, in extreme and sufficiently harsh circumstances, transferees 
might be able to claim some type of duty or obligation to protect 
against expropriation, is a question for other law.186 
D.  UNDERSTANDING THE NAKED ASSIGNEE:  
DISCOVERING THE FLAW IN THE LLC AS ENTITY 
If “there is nothing new under the sun”187 and the limited liability 
company is an amalgam of partnership and corporation, how is it pos-
sible for LLC law to be flailing about with such a troublesome issue?188  
 185. Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act § 112(b). 
 186. Id., cmt.  The Uniform Law Commissioners first seriously considered the naked 
assignee issue several years before the Re-ULLCA drafting process, in the context of 
conversions and mergers involving limited partnerships.  A reporter’s “endnote” to an 
early draft of the “Re-RULPA” commented: 
What protection exists for holders of such ‘bare’ interests?  They have no right to vote 
and no right to seek appraisal.  Contrast the situation for partners who lack enough 
votes to block a merger.  Suppose, for example, that: (i) a limited partnership has two 
classes of limited partner interests, (ii) the partnership agreement allows a merger to 
occur if a majority of all interests, voting in the aggregate, concur, and (iii) a merger is 
proposed and approved with provisions that significantly prejudice one of the classes.  
At least the owners of interests of the disadvantaged class can claim breach of the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing.  Transferees do not even have that recourse.  One 
possible solution – extend the obligation of good faith and fair dealing to transferees, 
but only in the context of a merger. 
Revision of Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1976), Oct. 1998 Draft, available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ulpa/rulp1098.pdf, at 304.  The official 
Comments to the final version of ULPA 2001 recognize but do not resolve the problem.  
Sections 1102 (Conversion) and 1106 (Merger) contain the following, essentially identi-
cal comment: 
If the converting [merging] organization is a limited partnership, the plan of con-
version will determine the fate of any interests held by mere transferees.  This Act 
does not state any duty or obligation owed by a converting [merging] limited part-
nership or its partners to mere transferees.  That issue is a matter for other law. 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ 
archives/ulc/ulpa/final2001.pdf, at 159. 
 187. Ecclesiastes 1:9. 
 188. Admittedly, as Bauer, 849 P.2d at 1365, illustrates, the problem is not com-
pletely novel.  However, as will be seen, the problem is more acute under LLC law than 
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One explanation is that the LLC is not the apotheosis of the business 
organization as separate entity.  The formal disengagement between the 
entity and its owners is incomplete. 
An entity and its owners might be engaged or distinct in several 
ways.189  First, the entity might be distinct from or engaged in the iden-
tity of its owners.  Specifically, where the addition of new owners has no 
effect on the identity of the entity, the identity of its owners is distinct; 
conversely, where the addition of new owners causes a new entity to re-
place the old entity, entity are owners are engaged.  Similarly, dissocia-
tion of an owner can either:  (i) have no effect on the identity of the 
entity (distinct identity of owners); (ii) cause the entity to end (engaged); 
or (iii) threaten to end the entity (semi-engaged).  The same is true of 
transfer of ownership.  A transfer may have no connection to the identity 
of its owners (distinct), or the entity’s organic statute may provide con-
straints on transfer (engaged). 
Second, the entity’s property might be distinct from or engaged 
with the property of its owners.  Where the property is distinct, judgment 
creditors of owners have no right to entity’s property.  In contrast, where 
the entity’s property is engaged with the property of its owners, judg-
ment creditors of owners have direct access to the entity’s property. 
Third, entity obligations might be distinct from or engaged with the 
obligations of its owners.  Where obligations are distinct, obligations of 
the entity are not ipso facto obligations of the owners, and obligations of 
the owners (whether joint or individual) are not ipso facto the obliga-
tions of the entity.  In contrast, where the obligations of the entity and 
owners are engaged, obligations of the entity are automatically the obli-
gations of the owners and obligations of the owners are automatically 
the obligations of the entity. 
The following table uses the attributes listed above to assess the 
entity character vel non of nine different types of business organizations.  
The table also considers perpetual duration, an attribute closely related 
to entity continuity.190 
 
under partnership law - at least partnership law prior to revisions made over the past 
decade. 
 189. This analysis is reminiscent of the method the Internal Revenue Service once 
used to determine whether to classify an unincorporated business organization as a cor-
poration or partnership for federal income tax purposes.  BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, supra note 35, ¶ 2.01 (discussing the Kintner 
Regulations). 
 190. If the statute governing a business organization requires each organization to be 
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 Table 1 
 X = attribute is entity-like 
x = attribute has some entity character 
 pre- UPA RUPA RUPA 
LLP 
RULPA ULP
A 
2001 
LLC Re-
ULLCA 
Corp.
UPA 
gen. 
(1914) (1992) (1976/ pre 
(1997) 1985) check 
the 
box 
(2006) 
pshp. 
new 
owner 
effect 
X X X X X X X X X 
dissocia-
tion effect   x x x X x X X 
Perpetual      X  X X duration 
Entity 
stance re:         X transfer of 
ownership 
access to 
entity  X X X X X X X X property
191
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liability 
for en
obli-
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tity 
192
   X x X X X X 
gations
Entity 
automati
liabi
 
c 
lity 
r 
gations
x X X X X X X X X for 
Owne
obli-
193
either “at will” [of its owners] or to have a stated term, the organization does not have 
per
es no nexus between the dissociation of a member and the 
early days, the modern U.S. law of LLCs required every LLC to have a specified, lim-
petual duration.  As explained in a comment to Re-ULLCA: 
In this context, the word ‘perpetual’ is a misnomer, albeit one commonplace in LLC 
statutes.  Like all current LLC statutes, this Act provides several consent-based 
avenues to override perpetuity:  a term specified in the operating agreement; an event 
specified in the operating agreement; member consent.  Section 701 (events causing 
dissolution).  In this context, ‘perpetuity’ actually means that the Act does not require 
a definite term and creat
dissolution of the entity. 
Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, § 104(c), cmt.  Although the Kintner 
Regulations did not address perpetual duration, before the “check the box” regulations, 
almost all LLC statutes required each LLC to have a stated term of existence.  BISHOP & 
KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, supra note 35, ¶ 9.02 [1][a] (“In its 
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As Table 1 reflects: (i) the U.S. law of unincorporated business 
organizations has been, in general, moving toward fully-separate entity 
status; and (ii) the LLC is the apotheosis of this development, with one 
notable exception.  Even under the most modern LLC statute, the entity 
remains fundamentally engaged in the identity of its owners through 
built-in, statutory restrictions on the transfer of governance rights.194 
This anomaly helps explain the plight of the naked transferee.  In 
the corporate context, aspects of ownership can be separately alienated 
but a naked transferee can never exist.195  Economic rights are necessar-
ily connected – even if transferred – to some underlying, existing stock.  
Even non-voting stock has some rights; stockholders have derivative 
standing to assert mismanagement claims and direct standing to assert 
expropriation or oppression claims.196 
The naked assignee has no such rights.  Severing the nexus between 
dissociation and entity termination, retaining the entity’s engagement in 
owner transfer (the “pick your partner” principal), and providing for per-
petual duration have created a “lockin”/oppression danger inconceivable 
in the law of close corporations. 
 
ited term of existence.”). 
 191. Carter G. Bishop, Thomas Earl Geu, & Daniel S. Kleinberger, Charging 
Orders and the New Uniform Limited Partnership Act Dispelling Rumors of Disaster, 
18 PROB. & PROP. 30, 30-31 (2004) (explaining how, before the invention of the 
charging order, a judgment creditor of a partner could cause partnership property to be 
seized). 
 192. Subject to claims to “pierce the veil” – i.e., to conflate the owners with the 
entity to reach the owners for the benefit of the entity’s creditors.  See BISHOP & 
KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, supra note 35, ¶ 6.03[4][a] (Traditional 
Piercing – Disregard the Entity to Reach the Member). 
 193. Subject to claims for a “reverse pierce” – i.e., to conflate the owners with the 
entity to reach the entity for the benefit of the owner’s creditors.  See BISHOP & 
KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, supra note 35, ¶ 6.03[4][a] (Limits of 
the Shield:  Piercing the Veil). 
 194. Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act § 502(a); see also BISHOP & 
KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, supra note 35, ¶ 8.06 n.434 (“Even after 
‘check the box,’ LLC statutes have preserved the ‘pick-your-partner’ approach, 
obviously for reasons independent of tax classification.”). 
 195. See generally DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS:  
LAW AND PRACTICE, §§ 2:4 & 2:6 (West updated through 2007); Kleinberger, Direct 
Versus Derivative, supra note 69, at 89. 
 196. See generally Id. §§ 2:4 & 2:6 (West updated through 2007); Kleinberger, 
Direct Versus Derivative, supra note 69 at 89. 
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Perpetual duration, in particular, has removed a safety valve that 
formerly provided at least some recourse to assignees.  Under UPA § 
32(2), for example, an assignee had standing to seek judicial dissolution 
of an at-will general partnership at any time and of a partnership for a 
term or undertaking if the partnership continued in existence after the 
completion of the term or undertaking.197  RUPA § 801(6) maintained 
the safety valve, while adding the requirement that the court determine 
that dissolution is equitable.198  ULLCA § 801(5) followed RUPA. 
In contrast, ULPA 2001 eliminated that remedy as moot, given the 
Act’s provision for perpetual duration.199  For the same reason, the 
remedy does not appear in Re-ULLCA.200  In fact, toward the end of the 
drafting process the Re-ULLCA drafting committee eliminated language 
that would have allowed a transferee to seek dissolution in egregious 
circumstances.201  In sum, under most LLC acts, absent a contrary 
agreement: 
 
• A person who ceases to be a member of an LLC, for any reason, 
has no “pay out” right and becomes solely a transferee of the 
person’s own transferable interest; 
• The transferee of a transferable interest does not become a 
member, has no governance rights and virtually no information 
rights, regardless of whether the transfer was voluntary, 
involuntary, gratuitous, or for consideration; 
 197. Uniform Partnership Act § 32(2). 
 198. Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 801(6). 
 199. An early version of what became ULPA 2001 proposed to preserve the remedy: 
On application by or for a transferee the [designate the appropriate court] court may 
decree dissolution of a limited partnership if: 
? the limited partnership amended its certificate of limited partnership to extend 
the limited partnership’s term after having notice of the transfer or entry of the 
charging order that gave rise to the transferee’s interest; 
? the limited partnership’s term would have expired but for that amendment; and 
? it is equitable to dissolve the limited partnership and wind up its business. 
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 802(b), Feb. 1998 Draft, (footnotes 
omitted).  At its March, 1999 meeting, the drafting committee eliminated this remedy.  
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, July 1999 Draft, § 802 cmt. to former 
subsection (b).  These drafts are available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ 
ulc.htm#ullca. 
 200. Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act § 701(a). 
 201. Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, Feb. 2006 Draft, § 701(a)(5), 
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ullca/2006febmtg.htm (provid-
ing standing to seek dissolution on grounds of oppression to “a member, a dissociated 
member that has retained a transferable interest, or a transferee”). 
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• Members may alter the operating agreement and affect a trans-
feree’s rights, without the consent of the transferee; and 
• The LLC’s duration is perpetual and a transferee has no right to 
seek dissolution, which means that the transferee is “locked in” 
to its status in perpetuity, or until the members decide other-
wise.202 
 
Shareholders in control of a close corporation might desire a com-
parable situation, but they cannot have it.  The full entity nature of the 
corporation stands in the way.  Because corporation statutes do not en-
gage the corporation in the identity of its owners, a corporation can have 
no “bare naked assignees.” 
In the corporate sphere, attempts to circumscribe transfer rights 
must be made through agreements among the shareholders.  Corporate 
law views such agreements as restraints on alienation.  As a result, cor-
porate law disfavors such agreements, strictly interprets them, and inval-
idates them when they seek to impose unreasonable restrictions.203  
Under corporate law, it would be unreasonable to freeze in a would-be 
transferor or to permit transfers only where the transferee lacks all rights 
to protect its investment. 
Thus, the problem of the bare naked assignee exists because the 
LLC is not quite the separate entity as is the corporation. 
CONCLUSION 
The limited liability company offers an almost ineffably flexible 
structure for business organizations, but that flexibility does not place 
the LLC beyond the range of traditional, formalist analysis.  To the 
contrary, parsing the LLC in pursuit of conventional forms may allow us 
“to know the place for the first time.”204 
 
 202. Kleinberger & Bishop, supra note 157, at 543.  The quoted passage refers to 
LLCs formed under Re-ULLCA but is also applicable to most current state LLC 
statutes. 
 203. Kleinberger, The Closely Held Business, supra note 66, at 866-67; see also In 
re Trilling & Montague, 140 F. Supp. 260, 261 (E.D. Pa. 1956); Phillips v. Newland, 
166 So. 2d 357, 359 (La. Ct. App. 1964). 
 204. T.S. ELIOT, FOUR QUARTETS 39 (Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1943) (“We shall not 
cease from exploration and the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we 
started and know the place for the first time.”). 
